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ABSTRACT

Obviousness is one of the most litigated elements of patent of validity,
due primarily to the enormous gray area between the roles of judge
and jury. While obviousness is ultimately a legal question, the courts
make an effort to leave the underlying factual determinations to the
jury, with mixed results. McGinley v. Franklin Sports, Inc. illustrates
the problems with the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit's
current approach as to what role juries and district court judges
should play in determining obviousness of a patent. Instead of the
McGinley approach of maintaining a significant role for juries in
resolving obviousness, the courts should embrace an expanded role
for judges who are better equipped to handle the frequently complex
decisions behind the ultimate question of obviousness. Any decisions
left to the jury should be specifically laid out in the form of a special
verdict to ensure that the jury is making their decisions on solid legal
basis.
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MAKING A PITCH FOR EXTENDING A JUDGE'S POWER TO DETERMINE OBVIOUSNESS:
HOW THE MCGINLEY COURT STRUCK OUT
JOHN PETRAVICH*
"[Ailmost routinely, one party or the other strikes from the jury the most
educated

and

experienced

persons,

so that

routinely there

is

a

conscious

effort to get an unsophisticated, uninformed jury, [that] one party hoping that
jury will unwittingly give the party a windfall"'

"I'd rather be hit blindside by [Lawrence Taylor] than have a Roger
Clemens fastball come at my head"

2

Obviousness is the most unsettled condition of patent validity, when viewed in
terms of quantity of litigation. 3 One of the primary purposes of the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) is to settle uncertainties and provide a consistent

roadmap for district courts to follow when resolving patent issues. 4 The overall
success of the CAFC in serving this role is evidenced in the growing strength of
intellectual property rights in recent history. 5 The CAFC now needs to provide the
district courts with better-defined guidelines to resolve obviousness disputes that will
result in fair outcomes for both sides. This task begins with better defining the roles

of juries and judges in determining questions of obviousness.

INTRODUCTION
McGinley v. Franklin Sports, Inc. 6 illustrates the problems with the CAFC's
current approach to what roles juries and the district courts should play in
determining obviousness of a patent. This case also displays the extent in which a
district court needs to determine the facts in order to determine obviousness. The
inventor in McGinley charged Franklin Sports with infringement of his patent for a
baseball

with

markings

instructing

the

user

on

how

to pitch

several

standard

* J.D. Candidate, June 2004, The John Marshall Law School; B.S. Cell and Molecular Biology,
San Diego State University, 1998. The author would like to thank the editorial staff of The John
Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law for their contributions. The author extends special
thanks to Naomi Petravich for her love and support.
I Tom Arnold, WhyADR?, PATENT LITIGATION 1999, 1013, 1039 (PLI Patents, Copyrights,
Trademarks, & Literary Property Course Handbook Series No. 572, 1999), reprinted in Michael A.
Fisher, Going for the Blue Ribbon: The Legality of Expert Juries in Patent Litigation, 2 COLUM. SCI.
& TECH. L. REV. 1, 2 (2000/2001).
2 Michael Wilbon, M.J. Goes fora Triple, Double, WASH. POST, Feb. 9,1994, at Fl.
I Bradley G. Lane, A Proposal to View Patent Claim Nonobviousness From the Policy
Perspective of FederalRule of Civil Procedure 52(a), 20 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1157, 1159 (1987).
See Chief Judge Glenn L. Archer, Conflicts and the Federal Circuit,29 J. MARSHALL L. REV.
835, 835 36 (1996) (claiming that the CAFC has been successful in resolving disparities between
regional circuits).
5 Id.
13McGinley v. Franklin Sports, Inc., 262 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
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baseball pitches.7
McGinley's baseball, the Roger Clemens Instructional Baseball,
had tapered, egg-shaped markings that not cnly were placement indicators for the
user's fingers, but they indicated the configuration of the user's hand in relation to
the ball.

8

There are two relevant patents in the prior art:9 the "Pratt" patent and the
"Morgan" patent. The Pratt patent describes a similar baseball with circles instead
of tapered eggs. 10 The inventor argued that the Pratt patent did not have as many
markings for right and left-handed pitchers, and that the circles did not indicate to
the users how the hand should be positioned around the ball. The Morgan patent,
describes a plastic replica baseball with more elaborate finger placement markings
that demonstrate both finger placement and hand configuration. However, the
invention in the Morgan patent is two plastic hemispheres that are connected to each

other to replicate a baseball.12 Therefore, the invention could not serve as a baseball
like the McGinley or Pratt baseballs could. 13
Although obviousness is a question of law, 14 the underlying facts that determine
obviousness are still questions of fact for juries to decide. 15 After hearing the
testimony, the jury for the McGinley case found the patent nonobvious in light of the
Pratt and Morgan patents. 16 However, the jury did not identify the facts that were
relied upon in their determination of the patent as nonobvious. 17 Thus, the trial judge
7Id. at 1342.
8 Id. at 1344.
The first patent was issued to William D. Pratt for a "Baseball Training AM." U.S. Patent No.
2,925,273 (issued Feb. 16, 1960). The "Pratt" baseball has colored circles on a normal baseball that
indicate different pitching grips. McGinley, 262 F.3d at 1344. The second patent was issued to Tom
Stephen Morgan for a "Baseball Training Device." U.S. Patent No. 3,110,494 (issued Nov. 12, 1963).
The "Morgan" baseball, was not an actual baseball, but rather a grooved sphere to indicate the
positioning and orientation of the hand to throw different pitches. McGinley, 262 F.3d at 1344.
10 McGinley, 262 F.3d at 1345. The Pratt patent's written description also described three
separate sets of markings for three different pitches, but the Pratt patent did not have distinct sets
of markings for right and left-handed pitchers. Id.
I d.

12 Id. The plastic hemispheres were lightweight and could be glued together in order to form a
sphere. Id.
13Id.

14 Id. at 1349. See also 2-5 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 5.04 at 3 (clarifying that
"if the conclusion is one of law, then the judge, not the jury, would decide the question of
obviousness, and any such decision at the trial court level would be freely reviewable on appeal").
I, McGinley, 262 F.3d at 1349. See also 3 Chisum on Patents § 5.04 (stating that "[i]f the
conclusion is one of fact, then a finding of obviousness or nonobviousness by a trial court would be
insulated from appellate review unless 'clearly erroneous'... and the conclusion of obviousness would
be appropriately submitted to a jury for resolution").
IGMcGinley, 262 F.3d at 1350. The jury answered three questions in a verdict form:
First, they found that [Franklin Sports] had not proven by clear and
convincing evidence that each of the elements of the invention defined in
[McGinley's claims] is disclosed in Pratt ... Second, the jury found that [Franklin
Sports Inc.] had not proven by clear and convincing evidence that any of the
asserted claims were invalid as being obvious in view of Pratt alone. Finally, the
jury found that [Franklin Sports Inc.] had not proven by clear and convincing
evidence that any of the asserted claims were invalid as being obvious in view of a
combination of Pratt and Morgan.
Id. at 1350.
1IId. at 1359.
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granted the defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) and set aside
the verdict.18 The CAFC reversed the trial judge and reasoned that it was possible
based on the facts of the case for a reasonable jury to find infringement.19 The CAFC
declined to extend their legal inquiry any further into the case. 20
Judge Michel dissented, and remarked that it was a close call as to whether the
McGinley baseball was anticipated by the Pratt patent alone. Michel noted that the
Pratt patent contained "phantom lines" that were not actually drawn on the ball, but
21
served to indicate how a pitcher should hold the ball in reference to the circles.
22
Thus, the Pratt patent seemingly had all of the elements of McGinley's baseball.
Judge Michel was convinced that the combination of the Pratt and Morgan patents
rendered the McGinley patent obvious. The only argument against this finding was
whether McGinley could shorten the lines on the Morgan device in order to fit them
on a Pratt baseball, which is essentially what the McGinley patent did. 23 Michel also
argued that the commercial success of the McGinley baseball was more a testament
to the endorser, professional baseball pitcher Roger Clemens, than to the question of
non-obviousness that was before the jury. 24 Judge Michel voiced concern for the
CAFC's inability to overturn the factual determination de novo because it would tie
25
the Federal Circuit's hands every time it considered a review of obviousness.

18 McGinley, 262 F.3d at 1355.
19.Id. The Federal Circuit Court ctermined that McGinley presented sufficient evidence to
prove that the prior art references teach away from his baseball because the Pratt ball had
additional features that limited the possibility of extended finger marks. Id. The Court reasoned
that the Pratt ball had rotational arrows and an equatorial band that helped make it possible for a
pitcher to see from his pitch if he had the correct rotation on the ball. Id. If the finger placement
markings were larger, they would cross the equatorial band and the rotational arrows and therefore
would take away from that function of the Pratt ball. Id. This issue is the primary reason the Court
found sufficient evidence for the jury's findings. Id.
211 McGinley, 262 F.3d at 1356. The court addressed the dissenfs concern in determining when
it would be permissible in an obviousness determination to override the jury's fact-finding,
especially when the jury's reasoning is vague. Id. Rather than make an attempt to draw a line in
the sand, the court restated their belief that the evidence was so strong in McGinley's favor that this
was a non-issue in this case. Id.
21
McGinley, 262 F.3d at 1361. Judge Michel noted expert testimony which stated that it
would be difficult for anyone throwing a baseball to approach the Pratt circles any other way than
the correct way as far as hand configuration in relation to the ball. Id. A user could grab it from one
of two ways if they followed the spots on the Pratt ball. Id. One way is the correct way, and the other
would be grabbing it from the opposite hemisphere. Id. A reasonable user would realize that
grabbing the ball by the opposite hemisphere is very awkward and they would be incapable of
throwing the ball in a normal fashion. Id.
2
McGinley, 262 F.3d at 1361. Judge Michel makes the point that the only real difference
between McGinley's ball and Pratt's ball is that Pratt's ball did not orient the hand to the ball. Id.
But Judge Michel is convinced that the Pratt patent does cover such orientation. Id.
23
Id. at 1361. Although Judge Michel believes the Pratt patent alone renders the McGinley
baseball obvious, he alternately argues that the Morgan and Pratt patents combine to render the
McGinley baseball obvious. Id.
21 Id. at 1363. As Judge Michel points out, it is difficult to determine why the jury ended with a
verdict for the plaintiff because they did not expressly list their factual findings upon which they
based the verdict. Id.
25

Id.
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Defining the jury's role in patent litigation is becoming increasingly important
as the amount of patent trials which go to a jury increase. 26 Patterns in jury verdicts
are now becoming apparent. One could argue that the jury weighs factors, such as
which party brought the suit, more heavily than the substantive facts brought out at
trial. 27 This is especially apparent in cases of patent infringement, where the jury's

tendency is to favor patent-holders over the accused infringers. 28 The conventional
business standards and morals that juries bring with them into the black box are
often contradictory to the policies behind patent law. 29 Critics have proposed several
alternatives to traditional juries for patent law, such as hearings through the Patent
and Trademark Office, 30 juries comprised of patent attorneys or agents,3 1 juries of
scientists skilled in the art, 32 or experienced judges. 33 The simplest solution would be
to extend a judge's power to determine questions of obviousness, much the same as a
judge's authority to decide claim interpretation.
This comment will first analyze the jury's role in determining claim
interpretation. The next section will compare the doctrine of obviousness and the
doctrines of claim interpretation. Finally, the author will suggest that the jury's role
in determining obviousness should be aligned with the current role juries play in
claim interpretation, and that special verdicts should be required from the arbiters of
fact to ensure that the jury's role is limited.

I. BACKGROUND
The Patent Act of 1952 lists three conditions for patentability. 34 Section 101
requires a claimed invention to have utility, essentially meaning it must be a useful
26

See Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases

An EmpiricalPeek Inside the

Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 366 (2000) (comparing percentages of patent cases tried by juries
over time, Moore notes that in 1940, 2.5% of patent cases in district courts were in front of juries,
and this was constant until 1970). From 1997 through 1999, 59% of patent cases were in front of
juries. Id. at 366.
27 Id. at 368. After extensively studying the differences in the outcomes of cases tried in front of
juries rather than judges, Moore notes both similarities and differences. Id. Both judges and juries
are similar in the rate of finding patents enforceable, and both are affirmed by appellate courts at
the same rate. Id. But juries are more likely to find patents valid, infringed and willfully infringed,
and juries more often decide whole suits rather than answering specific issues. Id. Most
significantly, juries are often swayed by which party brings suit. Id. The patent holder wins 68% of
the cases when he brings an infringement suit, but they only win 38% of the time when the other
party brings a declaratory judgment suit. Id. Judges, by contrast, are uniform along both categories
of suits. Id.
28 Id.
29 Jens H. Hillen, The Court of Appeals for the FederalCircuit:Independent Review of Patent
Decisions and the ConstitutionalFacts Doctrine, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 187, 187 88 (1993) (explaining
that people tend to favor a free-market system and disfavor monopolies, but the policies behind the
patent system are to reward new technology with a monopoly on the newly invented technology).
.30 David B. Pieper, The Appropriate JudicialActor for PatentInterpretation:A Commentary
on the Supreme Court's Decision in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 51 ARK. L. REv. 159,
179 81 (1998) (suggesting alternatives to traditional juries for Markman hearings).
'3' Id. at 179-80.
32 Id. at 180.
3' Id.

-3d35 U.S.C. §§ 101

103 (2003).
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invention. 35 Section 102 requires the patented invention to be novel. 36 Both utility
and novelty were statutory requirements prior to the 1952 Act. 37 Section 103 of the
1952 Act added the requirement for non-obviousness as a third condition for
patentability. 38 An invention is obvious if the collective prior art would have made
the invention apparent to a person of ordinary skill in the art. 3 9 In 1966, the Supreme
Court in Graham v. Deere held that Section 103 was a codification of a court-made
condition of obviousness that was first announced in
1851 by Hotchkiss v.
Greenwood.40 In Hotchkiss, the court determined that a new patent for porcelain
doorknobs would not be valid in light of similar prior art of metal doorknobs. 4 1 The
Graham Court formulated a new test for the obviousness requirement. It defined four
factors for determining obviousness: 1) the scope and content of the prior art; 2) the
differences between the prior art and the subject invention; 3) the level of ordinary
skill in the art; and 4) secondary considerations, such as commercial success and
42
failure of others.
The Graham decision did not explicitly declare that obviousness was a question
of law, 4 3 and hence reviewable de novo by appellate courts. However, the cases that
followed assumed that the Graham holding made it a question of law. 44 In Panduit

3535 U.S.C. § 101 (2003) (stating: "Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new or useful improvement thereof, may
obtain a patent therefore, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.").
-36Sections 102(a), 102(e) and 102(g) are the sections of 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2003) that refer to
novelty. Section 102(a) prohibits a patent on any invention 'known or used by others in this
country, or patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the
invention thereof by the applicant for patent." 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2003). Section 102(e) prohibits a
patent on any invention "described in a patent granted on an application for patent by another filed
in the United States before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent." 35 U.S.C. § 102(e)
(2003). Section 102(g) prohibits a patent on any invention that 'before the applicant's invention
thereof the invention was made in this country by another who had not abandoned, suppressed, or
concealed it." 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (2003).
'3- Graham v. Deere, 383 U.S. 1, 12 (1966).
.3835 U.S.C. § 103 (2003) states:
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically
disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences
between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that
the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention
was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter
pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention
was made.
'39 Id.
4I Graham, 383 U.S. at 17, citing Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. 248 (1851). The Graham
court cites the legislative history to support their conclusion that there was no change in the level of
patentability when section 103 was passed by the legislature. Id.
1' Hotchkiss, 52 U.S. 248 (1851).
42 Graham, 383 U.S. at 17-18. See also Hillen supra note 29, at 200. (generalizing all secondary
factors as primarily economic factors and includes: "acquiescence by competitors who seek licenses
instead of challenging the patent, simultaneous solution by diverse inventors, and approval by
experts in the field").
>: Lane, supra note 3, at 1164.
' In 1985, in Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg., the CAFC declared that the question of
obviousness ultimately was a legal question. Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg., 774 F.2d 1082 (Fed.
Cir. 1985), vacated 475 U.S. 809 (1986), on remand, 810 F.2d 1561 (Fed. Cir.), cert denied 481 U.S.
1052 (1987). However, the underlying facts, such as what is actually disclosed in the prior art and

[3:156 2003]

Extending a Judge's Power to Determine Obviousness

Corp. v. Dennison Mfg., the CAFC made the legal and factual demarcation after the
Supreme Court requested the CAFC elaborate on what determinations in the
question of obviousness would be subject to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a).45
The CAFC determined that they could review a district court's legal conclusion
without regard to Rule 52(a). 46
Rule 52(a)47 can be traced to the United States Constitution's Seventh
Amendment requirement which guarantees a party a trial of one's peers if that right
existed in a court of law prior to 1791.48 Although patent cases were tried before
1791, many of the issues that are involved in today's patent litigation were nonexistent 200 years ago. 49 Today's courts have a duty to decide whether a 1791 court
50
would have allowed a jury to sit for such modern issues.
Normally, the Supreme Court isthe court of last resort for Seventh Amendment
issues. 5 1 However, in Panduit, the Supreme Court allowed the CAFC to determine
how far a jury should be allowed to determine the facts regarding issues of
obviousness. 52 The CAFC was formed to receive patent cases and relieve the Supreme
Court of their case load on these kinds of issues. 53 One of the CAFC's purposes is to
what invention is being claimed, are questions of fact to be determined by the jury. Panduit,810
F.2d at 1566. The jury's determination will only be overturned on appeal if found to be clearly
erroneous. Id.
15 Panduit,475 U.S. at 811. The Supreme Court in Panduit,deferring to the underlying policy,
allowed the CAFC to mark both the jury's and judge's boundaries when determining questions of
obviousness. See also Hillen, supra note 29, at 190 93. Congress created the CAFC in 1982 to
specialize in only a few areas of law, one area being patent law. Id. The policy reason for the
specialization of the CAFC was to make the country's patent laws more consistent. Id.
Panduit,810 F.2d at 1568.
4'Rule 52(a) states that the district courts are responsible for deciding the facts of a case, and
the circuit courts will not overturn the district court's factual determinations unless the findings are
clearly erroneous. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
18 Pieper, supra note 30, at 170. A court will look at the action at issue and find the closest
comparison to a pre- 1791 action. Id. As mentioned in the Graham case, the Hotchkiss decision in
1851 was the first obviousness decision in patent law, and would therefore have to be analogized to a
similar pre-1791 action. Id.
49 Id. at 187-88. Pieper provides a list of patent issues that are a factually tried by a jury, and
another list tried by a judge:

[J]uries have been used to determine the factual issues surrounding:
enforceability, licensing, invalidity, invalidity for obviousness, invalidity for
nondisclosure,
infringement,
ownership,
willful
infringement,
tortuous
interference with contract, damages, inequitable conduct, and advisory opinions
on inequitable conduct, equitable estoppel, laches, patent misuse, and unclean
hands, which are equitable issues that are typically decided by the judge. In
contrast, judges have determined as a matter of law the issues of:enablement,
public use, infringement, infringement without issues of material fact, patent
validity, and inducement to infringe.
Id.
5 Id.

Hillen, supra note 29, at 213 14.
52 Id. Hillen compares the CAFC's domain over patent law to the Supreme Court's domain over
First Amendment issues. The Supreme Court is the last resort for First Amendment issues, and
therefore they handle inconsistent rulings between the lower courts. Id. Since the CAFC is the only
court that hears appeals of patent law from the Federal District Courts, there will be no
inconsistencies for the Supreme Court to settle. Id.
5 Id. The CAFC's jurisdiction is based on subject matter rather than geography, but it still is a
circuit court. Id. Like other circuit courts, the CAFC is not a fact-finding body. Id. Hillen says:
01
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oversee and resolve the inconsistencies born out of the nature of patent litigation. 54
55
Thus, the CAFC is often the last resort for legal conclusions concerning patents.
The nature of patent law is doubly complex to a trial court. In addition to the
normally intricate legal determinations required, 56 there is also the need for coherent
understanding of the technology involved in the suit. 57 This dual burden on the jury
has worried some critics who do not trust a typical jurist to understand the
technology behind the patents. 58 Even the technical expertise of trial judges normally
pales in comparison to that of a typical CAFC judge. 59 The CAFC has recognized this
limitation of juries in the area of claim interpretation and ruled in Markman v.
60
Westview that the court should interpret the facts to determine claim construction.
The portion of the litigation where the judge weighs evidence to interpret the claims,
61
called "Markman hearings," is now a standard procedure in patent litigation.
Interpreting claims is a significant part of a patent trial. A great deal of patent
litigation is settled after claim interpretation is completed.62 Although the Markman
But because the CAFC, like the rest of the circuit courts, is conceptually
limited in its ability to reconsider factual issues already decided below, the CAFC
has had to liberally reinterpret certain facets of the patent law in those cases
where a more thorough understanding of the technical issues might - or would have led to a different result.
Id. at 190.
54 Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System, Structure and Internal
Procedures: Recommendation for Change, 67 F.R.D. 195 (1975). The commission's patent
consultants testified that "the lack of uniformity in decisions on patent-related issues has been
widespread" and that parties spend an inordinate amount of time and money forum shopping. Id. at
370.
55 Hillen, supra note 29, at 214.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 194 (commenting that patent law is the least favorite of a judge's duties due to the
highly technical, dry nature of issues).
08 Id. at 193.
9 The U.S. court's adversarial system relieves some of this burden to bring the judge and jury
in line with the technology because it is in the client's best interests for counsel to make the judge
and jury understand. Id. at 187. This leads to two additional problems. First, how likely is it that an
attorney can educate a judge who is looking for ways to lighten their caseload rather than spend
considerable time to learn new technologies? Id. at 193. Judges sitting in the CAFC generally have
technical backgrounds or have resided over more patent cases, so the ability of the judge to handle
highly technical issues is already assured. Id. at 219-20. Second, how can counsel bring a lay juror
with no science or math since high school to par with the education required to understand the
nuances of the current technology? Id. at 193.
11Markman v. Westview, 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
13 See generally William F. Lee and Anita K. Krug, Still Adjusting to Markman: A Prescription
for the Timing of Claim Construction Hearings, 13 IARv. J.L. & TeCH 55 (1999) (finding that
"Markman" hearings are now standard procedure in claim construction proceedings and the
arguments center primarily on the timing of the hearings and the CAFC's refusal to grant
interlocutory appeals of the judge's claim interpretations).
6) Markman, 52 F.3d at 989. In concurring with the majority in Markman, Justice Mayer felt
that the decision was:
not just about claim language, it [was] about ejecting juries from infringement
cases. For this is not just about claim language, it is about ejecting juries from
infringement cases. All these pages and all these words cannot camouflage what
the court well knows: to decide what the claims mean is nearly always to decide
the case.
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decision has been met with criticism, the critics are usually only concerned with the
inconsistency in timing of the Markman hearings.6 3 Some critics would like the
CAFC to also review a district judge's interpretation prior t) the completion of the
trial.6 4 However, the shift of the burden of interpreting the claims from the jury to
the judge is still good law.

II. ANALYSIS
Section A analyzes the current role juries play in claim interpretation. Section B
compares claim interpretation reasoning with the current role of the jury in
determining questions of obviousness. Section C analyzes the importance of special
verdicts in patent cases, particularly as to questions of obviousness. Finally, Section
D predicts future methods of determining obviousness using the court's reasoning in
McGinley.

A. The Jury's Role in DeterminingClaim Interpretation
In Markman, the inventor patented a method for a bar code computer system to
continually track the inventory of a dry cleaning business.6 5 The alleged infringer
also used a computer bar-code system for maintaining inventory for dry cleaning.
However, the alleged infringer's method was more limited than the inventor's method
because the alleged infringer's method could only track invoices and not specific
items of clothing.6 6 The district court deemed claim construction to be a question of
law, and therefore vacated the jury's finding of infringement and granted the
defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law. 67 The plaintiff used the term
"inventory" in the claims at issue, and the court decisively limited the term to mean
"articles of clothing".6 8 Since the defendant's system was only capable of tracking
invoices, the defendant's device did not infringe Markman's claims. 6 9 The CAFC and
70
the Supreme Court agreed with the district court.
13"
See Pieper, supra note 30, at 184:
Claim interpretation can now occur at five different stages of a lawsuit: 1)
before trial in a 'Markman hearing' or with other pretrial motions; 2) in
combination with other motions filed during trial; 3) at the end of trial before the
issues are presented to the jury; 4) after trial in overruling the jury's verdict; or 5)
on appeal for a de novo interpretation of the claims
Id.
64

Id.

135Markman, 52 F.3d at 971.
616 Id. at 972. The Markman invention's superiority to Westview's invention was a disadvantage
to Markman in his suit of infringement. The court read the advantages that Markman's invention
had over the defendant's device into the claims. Id. at 973. The claim interpretation required a
device that could track articles of clothing throughout the dry-cleaning, and the device could detect
and report missing or additional articles of clothing. Id. The Westview device could not perform
these functions. Id.
1Id. at 973.
68 Id.
1I3Id. Claim 1, the independent claim at issue in Markman, reads as follows:
1. The inventory control and reporting system, comprising:
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The Supreme Court's clarification of the jury's role in claim interpretation in
Markman significantly impacted patent law. 71 The Supreme Court clarified that
claim interpretation is a question of law, and the jury can use the judge's
interpretation to render a verdict. 72 The decision affects both the way patent law is
litigated and the way claims are drafted. 73 Although the Court recognized that the
impact of its decision would be profound, the Court nevertheless deemed its decision
74
critical to maintaining uniformity and predictability.
The

Court's

support

for allowing

the judge

to interpret

claims lies in

the

traditional role of a judge to interpret written evidence.75 The Court reasoned that

patents

are written instruments, and therefore the judge has sole discretion to

interpret them. 76 In

1877, the Supreme Court in Merrill v. Yeomans settled the issue

a data input device for manual operation by an attendant, the input device
having switch means operable to encode information relating to sequential
transactions, each of the transactions having articles associated therewith, said
information including transaction identity and descriptions of each of said articles
associated with the transactions;
a data processor including memory operable to record said information and
means to maintain an inventory total, said data processor having means to
associate sequential transactions with unique sequential indicia and to generate
at least one report of said total and said transactions, the unique sequential
indicia and the descriptions of articles in the sequential transactions being
reconcilable against one another;
a dot matrix printer operable under control of the data processor to generate
a written record of the indicia associated with sequential transactions, the written
record including optically -detectable bar codes having a series of contrasting
spaced bands, the bar codes being printed only in coincidence with each said
transaction and at least part of the written record bearing a portion to be attached
to said articles; and,
at least one optical scanner connected to the data processor and operable to
detect said bar codes on all articles passing a predetermined station, whereby said
system can detect and localize spurious additions to inventory as well as spurious
deletions therefrom.
Id. at 972.
70 Markman v. Westview, 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996).
71 See Pieper, supra note 30, at 181 (suggesting that in response to the Markman decision,
attorneys should now alter their strategies to take into account the interpretational methods used
by judges, the timing of claim interpretation, the methods used to educate the judge, and issues
remaining for the jury to decide).
72 The Markman court splits infringement into a two-step process:
The first step is determining the meaning and scope of the patent claims
asserted to be infringed. [citation omitted] The second step is comparing the
properly construed claims to the device accused of infringing. [citation omitted] It
is the first step, commonly know as claim construction or interpretation that is at
issue in this appeal.
Markman, 52 F.3d at 976.
7.1Pieper, supra note 30, at 181.
71 See Markman, 52 F.3d at 979. The court explained that a judge can better follow established
rules to interpret the prosecution history and the text of the patent than a jury. Id. Also,
determining claim interpretation to be a question of law allows for a permanent definition of rights
that are as reviewable as any other legal question. Id.
75 Id. at 978.
W Id. The Court attempts to narrow its argument for the judge interpreting written evidence
by restating that this is constitutionally allowable because claim construction was not a question of
fact prior to 1791. Id. at 984. The Markman Court also sets forth the argument that patents should
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of whether the judge or the jury interprets patents. 77 While interpreting a claim for a
process of deodorizing heavy hydrocarbon oils in the plaintiffs patent, the Court
stated that the patent must be interpreted using the "well-settled rules of construing
all instruments."7 8 However, until Markman, the jury played a larger role because of
the factual underpinnings of the doctrine. 7 9 This pre-Markman rationale is the
current rationale for determining obviousness, and the CAFC has yet to align the
obviousness issue with claim construction.

B.
The

Using the Logic of Markman to Reexamine the McGinley Decision

interpretation

determining
McGinley,
compared

of

obviousness.
in

simple

written instruments,

especially

patents,

is central

to

The McGinley case is an ideal example of this point.

terms,

was

one

with two written instruments

written
in

instrument,

McGinley's

patent,

the prior art, the Pratt and Morgan

patents.8 0 The trial judge determined that, as a matter of law, the McGinley patent
was obvious when compared to the other two patents.8 1 The majority opinion of the
CAFC reexamined the jury's findings and the district court's JMOL ruling by recreating the facts as they may have been presented at the trial.8 2 The majority

concluded, based on the evidence presented at trial, that a reasonable jury could find
83
nonobviousness between McGinley's invention and the prior art.

There are two parts to the issue of obviousness in McGinley. The first issue is
whether the Pratt ball itself would have been an obvious choice for combination with
the Morgan invention.8 4 The second issue is whether such a combination would

render the McGinley invention obvious.8 5 The first issue, comparing the physical
embodiments of the inventions at issue, is a question of fact, but the second issue,

not be considered analogous to contracts, deeds or wills because patents are statutory grants to
exclude others from the patented material. Id. at 984-85. These arguments by the Markman Court
also support the argument that judges should solely determine the written evidnen

in questions of

obviousness.
77Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568 (1877).
78Id. at 571. See also Bates v. Coe, 98 U.S. 31, 38 (1878) (construing the claims in a patent the
same as any other writing provision).
79 See Piper, supra note 30, at 167. "A patent is not just a written work, however, because it
embodies the factual aspects surrounding the invention. Thus, [the Markman] decision was a
departure from the traditional roles of the jury as the finder of fact and the judge as the interpreter
of law." Id.
8oMcGinley v. Franklin Sports, Inc., 262 F.3d 1339, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
8 Id. at 1347.
82 Id. at 1350-51. The McGinley Federal Circuit Court initially stated that the defendant had
presented enough evidence from which a jury could have determined obviousness. Id. at 1352.
Unsure of which specific evidence convinced the jury of non-obviousness, the court ran through a list
of evidence that could be found favorable to the plaintiff. Id. This included the testimonies of several
experts, the presumed validity of the patent, the prosecution history of the patent, and the
likelihood that the jury found the prior art to teach away from McGinley's device. Id. at 1352 54.
8-8
Id. at 1351-52.
81Id. at 1351.
85Id.
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comparing the patents, is a question of law because it requires interpretation of a
86
written instrument, the Pratt patent.
Using this reasoning, the majority's re-creation of facts would be limited. For
example, the majority describes how Franklin Sport's vice president of marketing
conceded that the circular markings on the Pratt invention could not indicate
orientation, and that the phantom lines shown in the Pratt drawings were not
actually on the ball.8 7 The vice-president's concession about the circles on the Pratt
baseball is a fact that the jury interprets while the vice-president's testimony
concerning the phantom lines is an interpretation of written evidence to be weighed
by the judge.
If the McGinley court followed the logic from the Markman decision, the trial
judge could interpret the three patents and find from the written evidence alone that
the McGinley patent was obvious. 88 This reasoning is what led the district court
judge to find for Franklin Sports as a matter of law, but the CAFC overturned the
decision.8 9 The CAFC notes that the district court granted the JMOL motion because
the secondary considerations were outweighed by the district court's conclusion that
the combination of the Pratt and Morgan patents rendered the McGinley patent
obvious as a matter of law. 90
The CAFC's approach to the standard of review in McGinley is a retreat from
the bright line drawn in Markman where written evidence is determined by the
judge. 91 Instead, the CAFC's decision aligns itself with the murky Panduit reasoning
that although obviousness is a question of law, the evidence leading to answering the
question is broadly labeled as facts decided by the jury. 92 The court errs on the side of
the Seventh Amendment in McGinley, but the court would not encounter a Seventh
Amendment issue at all if a special verdict was required that separated facts from
law. 93 If trial courts require special verdicts, the roles of the jury and judge can be
clearly defined.

C. The Role of Special Verdicts in the Determinationof Obviousness
The McGinley court maintained that special verdicts are not a legal requirement
in obviousness cases, but the whole case turned on the review of factual
determinations made by the jury. 94 The jury only had to answer whether they

8G See id. at 1356 (admitting the difficulty in determining what evidence the jury relied upon

for their resolution of the questions of fact).
87Id. at 1352.
88 See id. at 1359. The dissent agrees with the trial judge that after comparing the Pratt and
Morgan patents to the McGinley patent, there is obviousness as a matter of law. Id.
8'9
Id. The trial judge also found anticipation from the written evidence. Id.
9oId. at 1350.
9'Markman v. Westview, 52 F.3d 967, 978 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
92 See Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg., 810 F.2d 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
9 See McGinley, 262 F.3d at 1358. In his dissent, Judge Michel does not take the position that
special verdicts are required, but he notes that the issue on appeal in McGinley was the result of a
general verdict on the ultimate legal conclusion of obviousness. Id.
91 Id. at 1356. The Court's analysis is rife with hypothetical language such as "a reasonable
jury could have determined . .. ","t]he jury could have certainly concluded... ","a reasonable jury
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believed that the McGinley patent was anticipated in the light of the Pratt patent
alone or obvious in light of a combination of the Pratt and Morgan patents. 95 The
questions the jury answered did not include the elements of obviousness. Rather, the
jury questions merely allowed the jury to make a broad and unpredictable decision
about the question of obviousness.
In a prior decision, Richardson-Vicks v. Upjohn Company, the CAFC strongly
advocated special verdicts, particularly for determining obviousness, in light of the
interplay between questions of fact and law. 96 In Richardson -Vicks, the court
emphasized that the record evidence may be viewed in the light most favorable to the
verdict winner, but the ultimate decision on the question of obviousness must still be
97
made by the court.
The inventor in Richardson-Vicks patented a cold medicine, claiming varying
ratios of the combination of an analgesic ingredient and a decongestant ingredient in
the cold medicine. 98 Similar to the McGinley case, the alleged infringer in
Richardson-Vicks moved for summary judgment on grounds of obviousness, and the
court denied the motion and the case went to trial. 99 The jury held that the alleged
infringer failed to prove obviousness and awarded the inventor royalties from the
infringing product.1 00 Like McGinley, the trial judge granted the alleged infringer's
motion for judgment as a matter of law. 101 The appellate court proceeded to
reexamine all the facts de novo because they had no idea what the jury had
concluded as to the specific factual findings of the case. 102 The court listed the facts,

could have considered..." and "[t]he jury could have also concluded..." because they did not have
any idea which facts were actually considered by the jury as dispositive of the verdict. Id. at 1354.
95 Id. at 1356. The majority addresses the dissent's concerns and acknowledges that the
outcome could have been reversed if the jury's determinations were in the form of a special verdict
that clearly separated questions of fact from law. Id. However, the majority was comforted that the
parties to the litigation did not object to the three questions the jury answered to reach their verdict.
Id. The answers to the questions were:
First, the jury found that FSI had not proven by clear and convincing

evidence that each of the elements of the invention defined in claims 1, 2, 6 and 7
of the [McGinley] patent is disclosed in Pratt. This was a factual finding. Second,
the jury found that FSI had not proven by clear and convincing evidence that any
of the asserted claims were invalid as being obvious in view of Pratt alone.
Finally, the jury found that FSI had not proven by clear and convincing evidence
that any of the asserted claims were invalid as being obvious in view of a
combination of Pratt and Morgan.

Id.
9GRichardson-Vicks Inc. v. Upjohn Co., 122 F.3d 1476, 1485 (Fed. Cir. 1997).

The Richardson-

Vicks court underwent a similar analysis to determine an obviousness issue, and the court
concluded that special verdicts would be particularly useful in patent law. Id.
9- Id. at 1479.
98 Id. at 1477.
. Id. at 1478.
1(0 Id.
101

Id.

10i Id. at 1479. "Determining the facts and how they bore on the jury's view of the case is made
considerably more problematic when, as in the case before us, the only information we have about
the jury's views are contained in a general verdict." Id.
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described the evidence favorably for the alleged infringer, and concluded that they
103
agreed with the trial court.
There is a fine but crucial distinction between the Richardson-Vicks analysis
and the McGinley analysis. For both courts, the factual analysis was put in terms of
whether it was possible for a reasonable jury to reach their decision based on the
record. 104 However, the Richardson-Vick court realized that legal analysis begins
when the court starts to compare the factual differences between the prior art and
the claimed invention. 105 Perhaps the McGinley court believed the patent owner had
the stronger legal and factual argument, and therefore did not distinguish between
the two. In either event, the analysis the McGinley court used only succeeded in
1 07
clouding the obviousness issue for future arbiters. 106 Patent law's rapid ascendance
is hindered when the court misunderstands the case at bar and delivers an
undesirable outcome. But even worse, the law regresses when a court sets a new
precedent for factual analysis that is illogical and unwarranted. 108

D. Future Concerns Stemming from the McGinley Decision
Obviousness is a popular area of patent litigation. 109 It serves as an alternative
defense for parties who have already raised the defense of anticipation. 1 0
In
addition, there are so many factors that contribute to the final obviousness
determination that this defense is also the most appealed issue concerning patent
validity. 1 The McGinley reasoning will only extend obviousness litigation because
it will be more difficult for parties to predict the outcome of their cases based on
precedent.
Critics debate whether the Markman standard of review for claim interpretation
increases or decreases the amount of litigation. 112 But, one certainty of that standard
10.3Id. at 1480

84. In addition to the legal issues, the fact pattern of Richarson-Vicks also

closely parallels McGinley. The Richardson-Vicks court reduces the issue to "whether one of
ordinary skill in the art would have combined the two ingredients into a single form." Id. at 1480.
McGinleywas also about two items of prior art combining into one. McGinley v. Franklin Sports,

Inc., 262 F.3d 1339, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2001). In Richardson-Vicks, however, the court is not satisfied
that substantial evidence exists concerning unexpected results and commercial iccess, and they
rule as a matter of law that the evidence as a whole is clear and convincing that the claims are
obvious. Richardson-Vicks, 122 F.3d at 1484.
104McGinley, 262 F.3d at 1351; Richardson-Vicks, 122 F.3d at 1478.
"o Richardson-Vicks, 122 F.3d at 1479.
1o1See MeGinley, 262 F.3d at 1363. The dissenting opinion foresees additional situations
where general verdicts will make it difficult for appellate courts to make legal determinations on the
overall question of obviousness. Id.
107Mark

D. Janis, Patent Law in the Age of the Invisible Supreme Court, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV.

387, 405 (2001) (noting the record volume of patent cases now before the federal judiciary).
118MeGinley, 262 F.3d at 1363.
'o1 See Lane, supra note 3, at 1159 (stating that obviousness is more litigated than the other
two fundamental conditions for patent validity, utility and novelty).
110 See In re C. Steven McDaniel, 293 F.3d 1379, 1385 (2002) (stating that "itis well settled
that 'anticipation is the epitome of obviousness').
"I See Lane, supra note 3, at 1159.
112 Part of the policy behind the Court's decision in Markman is to bring consistency and
predictability to patent law. Markman, 52 F.3d at 978 79. Litigation will increase because parties
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is that a judge will be your audience for any claim interpretation argument, and
attorneys can construct their arguments with the judge in mind. 113 Furthermore, if a
judge reviews the case, they are more likely to relay to the parties involved the
specific reasoning behind their decision.11 4 Juries, on the other hand, do not respond
well to special verdicts.11 5 In addition, if a party can get past summary judgment and
reach the jury, then that party could feed the jury anything within the rules of
evidence or civil procedure. Consequently, no one would be able to determine which
crucial evidence the jury decided to hang their decision upon.

III. PROPOSAL: JUDGES SHOULD RESOLVE QUESTIONS OF OBVIOUSNESS ARISING FROM
WRITTEN EVIDENCE, AND OTHER EVIDENCE LEFT TO JURIES SHOULD BE SUMMARIZED
IN SPECIAL VERDICTS
Section A proposes to extend a district judge's authority to interpret written
evidence. Section B proposes a requirement for special verdicts from juries who are
responsible for resolving questions of fact.

A. A BrighterLine to Determine What Evidence Should Reside With the Judge
as a Question of Law
The first step in defining the parties' roles in resolving litigation is forming a
bright line for attorneys to follow during their preparation. Attorneys would better
calculate the costs of proceeding with patent litigation if they knew who their
audience would be for each item of evidence, and how such evidence would be
interpreted.1 1 6 If the role for judges and juries in resolving questions of obviousness
is similar to the roles they perform in questions of claim interpretation, the attorneys
could consolidate their strategies for both arguments.
The standard, in specific terms, would require the judge to interpret the written
evidence the same way a judge now reviews and interprets the claims. The judge
could review the evidence during the Markman hearings if applicable. The

will undoubtedly appeal for a de novo interpretation, and trial judges will delay Markman hearings
rather than risk a reversal by an appellate court. Pieper, supra note 30, at 177.
113 Id. at 182.
A judge, although highly skilled in the interpretation of legal documents, is
not a person who normally reads or writes in the technical style associated with
patent claims. Therefore, a party wishing to claim a new invention will be in a
better position when arguing a particular claim interpretation before a judge if
the specification is short, clearly written, and easy to understand for someone
with little skill in the relevant art.
Id.
114See Moore, supra note 26, at 368 (stating that, "[to a greater degree than judges, juries
tend to decide whole suits rather than delineate individual issues, even when separate issues are
presented to them via special verdict forms or interrogatories").
l5Id.

1 See Archer, supra note 4, at 835 (comparing patent attorneys to athletes by stating, "[f]or
all of them to perform well, they need the referees and umpires to be consistent, and they need the
rules of the game to be predictable").

[3:156 2003]

John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

determination process that judges use to resolve obviousness would be similar to the
claim interpretation determination, but instead of interpreting the scope of the claim,
the judge would determine the scope of a prior art's disclosure. 117 From this decision,
the question of fact may begin and the jury can weigh the judge's findings with the
other evidence presented.
There is a disadvantage of the proposed system because an extensive amount of
evidence could fall under the umbrella of "written instruments".11 8
Parties to
litigation already deal with this problem when it applies to claim interpretation. This
would simply extend the rule to obviousness.1 1 9 At the same time, all disputes over
claim interpretation and obviousness would be resolved during a Markman hearing.
This would provide the court with another reason to handle Markman hearings early
in the litigation process to avoid tiresome legal battles. 120 Adding an additional issue
such as obviousness at this phase would only strengthen the court's ability to render
a summary judgment and forego a trial.
Parties will also have an opportunity for their most complicated evidence, such
as convoluted patents and related material, to be reviewed by a judge who is
generally better educated than the average juror.121 This argument is made
frequently against juries in general, where instances of injustice can be traced to
juries that clearly missed the mark. Though these blanket statements about juries
117 See Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent Cases?, 15
HARV. J.L. & TCH 1, 5-7 (2001). Moore describes the current process that district court judges use
to interpret patent claims. Id. First, the judge will consider intrinsic evidence, which includes "the
claims, the specification, and the patents prosecution history." Id. at 5. The judge may also look at
intrinsic evidence in order to better understand the technology, and the extrinsic evidence includes
"dictionary definitions, learned treatises, expert testimony, or anything else the court deems helpful
to its task." Id. at 7.
I1s See American Intellectual Property Law Association, Guide to Jury Instructions in Patent
Cases 25 29 (1990) (reprinted in George M. Sirilla, 35 U.S.C. § 103: From Hotchkiss to Hand to
Rich, The Obvious Patent Law Hall-Of-Famers, 32 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 437, 575 (1999)). The jury
instructions listed the evidence that should be viewed to determine the scope and content of the
prior art, including:
1. Patents that issued more than one year before the filing date of the patent
or before the date of invention;
2. Publications having a date more than one year before the filing date of the
patent or before the date of invention;
3. U.S. patents that have a filing date prior to the date of invention of the
claimed subject matter in the patent;
4. Anything in public use or on sale in the U.S. more than one year before
the filing date of the patent in suit;
5. Anything that was publicly known or used by others in this country before
the date of invention of the claimed subject matter in the patent; and
6. Anything that was made or built in this country by another person before
the date of invention of the claimed subject matter in the patent where the thing
made or built was not abandoned, suppressed or concealed.
Id. The first three items listed are "written evidence" in the context of this article.
1,9 See Moore, supra note 117, at 5 7.
120 See generally Lee, supra note 61. The current problems with Markman hearings are the
inconsistency of the timing of the hearings during the litigation, and the CAFC's refusal to review
the district court's rulings on claim construction on interlocutory appeal. Id. The author proposes
that Markman hearings should generally occur after discovery but before trial to maximize the
judge's knowledge of the subject matter while still minimizing the costs of a trial. Id. at 81 85.
12 See Moore, supra note 26, at 369
74 (comparing competency levels of jurors and judges).
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may or may not be fair or correct, 122 with patent law, there is more than anecdotal
evidence that indicates differences in the outcomes of litigation between a judge and
123
a jury trial.
Patent litigation is known for being very technical and difficult to follow
compared to other types of law. 124 Yet the outcomes can mean significant windfalls
or hardships for companies.1 25 When a juror looks to resolve a patent issue, the
natural tendency will be to overlook evidence that is over their heads and to
concentrate on the delivery of counsel, comments by the witnesses, and external facts
about the backgrounds of the parties. 126 When a jury delivers a flawed verdict, a
1 27
great burden of proof is placed on the wronged party in the subsequent appeal.
However, if the verdict on the more complicated written instruments comes from a
judge, it not only may be more reliable, but the standard of review will be lower on
appeal.128
Opponents of Markman hearings argue that when a judge interprets the facts,
and therefore leaves the determination reviewable de novo, there will be increased
litigation since many parties are more likely to challenge a verdict, which has a
standard of review. 129 However, the door to de novo review has already been opened
with Markman's ruling that allows judges to interpret claims.1 30 Parties under the
proposed system will now appeal any judge interpretations in the same manner they
would appeal claim interpretations in Markman proceedings. Increased costs of
litigation would be counterbalanced by the consistency of the proposed uniform
standard of review. The new standard would also work in tandem with a proposed
requirement for special verdicts that would decrease the uncertainty of the issues to
be resolved upon appeal.

B. Requiring Special Verdicts from Juriesin Patent Litigation
Most of the problems besetting the resolution of obviousness claims could be
avoided by requiring juries to issue their findings through special verdicts.
Regardless of whether a bright line such as the one suggested above would ever come

122 Id. at 374 (acknowledging that other areas of law are also as complex as patent litigation
and therefore patent law is not alone in potential for unjust verdicts that stem from the jurors' lack
of knowledge).
12: Id. at 368. The evidence is in the form of a study of all patent cases that went to trial
between 1983 through 1999. Id. at 367. The study found that juries tend to decide cases more often
than judges by general verdict. Id. at 368. The study also showed that juries more so than judges
favor the patentee when they bring suit while favoring the infringer who initiates a declaratory
judgment. Id.
124 Gregory D. Leibold, In Juries We Do Not Trust: Appellate Review of Patent Infringement
Litigation, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 623, 623 (1996).
1'
See Bernard Wysocki Jr., Intellectual Property Trade Surplus Growing; Royalty and
Licensing Exports at $37 Billion, CtHi. TRIB., April 17, 2000, at C2; Pg. 2; ZONE: C(detailing that
U.S. exports in royalties and licensing alone were a $37 billion business in 1999).
121See Moore, supra note 26, at 369.
127 See Lane, supra note 3, at 1159.
128 Id.
12 See Pieper, supra note 30, at 177.
' o Markman v. Westview, 52 F.3d 967, 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
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to fruition, any system that limits a jury's determination of the overall dispute would
logically necessitate an open system that guarantees that the judge's domain is
retained. Without an open system, the division of responsibilities between the
adjudicators is only differentiated by name.
Often juries will struggle in conforming their opinions to a special verdict,131 but
this is a problem with the drafting of the special verdict form, not one inherent to the
jury. 132 With the special verdict, there is no need for appellate courts to recreate the
facts and determine how each fact may have played a part in the jury's overall
decision. 133 Judges are currently more agreeable to special verdicts than juries,
1 34
perhaps because they understand the need for a detailed record on appeal.
Special verdicts could potentially decrease the amount of appeals for several
reasons. Obviously, special verdicts could take away most appellate arguments
concerning standard of review and division of roles between the arbiters. Special
verdicts would also simplify and limit the arguments available on appeal because
often the jury's newly defined role would be harder to overturn and attorneys would
have to restrict their arguments to overturning a judge's ruling regarding claim
interpretation issues. 135 In addition, the added level of certainty would render some
potential appeals unnecessary. The inconvenience of parties to agree on a special
verdict, and the difficulty of jurors to struggle through filling out a special verdict,
are far outweighed by the certainty of the verdicts and their limiting of appeals.

IV. CONCLUSION
The limits of a constitutionally guaranteed right of a trial by a jury of one's peers
should always be carefully defined. The right to a jury to determine questions of fact
in obviousness issues has never been considered part of this constitutional guarantee.
When legal issues dictate a more just outcome by relieving juries of this obligation,
the relief should be granted. For patent issues of obviousness, the judge should be the
sole arbiter of questions of law, which include interpretation of written instruments.
To ensure that a judge's right to this determination is exclusive, courts should
require special verdicts from the arbiters of fact. The McGinley court missed an
opportunity to clarify the roles of the judge and jury when they decided to overlook
the discrepancies in these respective roles, but the murkiness of these ground rules
1-1
See Moore, supra note 26, at 368.
132 See generally Mark S. Brodin, Accuracy, Efficiency, and Accountability in the Litigation
Process

The Case for the Fact Verdict, 59 U. CIN. L. REv. 15 (1990) (arguing for special verdicts

and cautioning that special verdicts are only effective when they are written to avoid encompassing
questions of law and written in a clear and concise manner).
1'3,3
Richardson-Vicks v. The Upjohn Co., 122 F.3d 1476, 1485 (Fed. Cir. 1997). "The utilization
of Rule 49(a) [special verdicts] appears to us as a particularly useful tool in conserving judicial
resources and in effectuating the Congressional policy expressed in the patent laws." Id.
1 See Moore, supra note 26, at 368.

1 See generally Lane, supra note 3. Lane proposes following the policy behind Rule 52(A)
when determining obviousness claims on appeal. Id. Lane's reasoning is to foster consistency and
reliability in obviousness appeals because there is no current bright line for determining what
evidence should be reviewed under Rule 52(A). Id. Lane's proposed solution is for the same problem
of inconsistencies in the review process, but the proposal is far more sweeping when trying to define
the review process. Id.
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ensures that the CAFC will have another opportunity to resolve the issue in the
future.

